Adaptation and its Analogues: Biological Categories for Biosemantics by Greif, Hajo
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 90 (2021) 298–307Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsaAdaptation and its analogues: Biological categories for biosemantics
Hajo Greif







Language-mind co-evolutionE-mail address: mail@hajo-greif.net.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.10.016
Received 3 March 2021; Received in revised form
0039-3681/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Els
nc-nd/4.0/).A B S T R A C T
“Teleosemantic” or “biosemantic” theories form a strong naturalistic programme in the philosophy of mind and
language. They seek to explain the nature of mind and language by recourse to a natural history of “proper
functions” as selected-for effects of language- and thought-producing mechanisms. However, they remain vague
with respect to the nature of the proposed analogy between selected-for effects on the biological level and
phenomena that are not strictly biological, such as reproducible linguistic and cultural forms. This essay critically
explores various interpretations of this analogy. It suggests that these interpretations can be explicated by con-
trasting adaptationist with pluralist readings of the evolutionary concept of adaptation. Among the possible in-
terpretations of the relations between biological adaptations and their analogues in language and culture, the two
most relevant are a linear, hierarchical, signalling-based model that takes its cues from the evolution of co-
operation and joint intentionality and a mutualistic, pluralist model that takes its cues from mimesis and sym-
bolism in the evolution of human communication. Arguing for the merits of the mutualistic model, the present
analysis indicates a path towards an evolutionary pluralist version of biosemantics that will align with theories of
cognition as being environmentally “scaffolded”. Language and other cultural forms are partly independent
reproducible structures that acquire proper functions of their own while being integrated with organism-based
cognitive traits in co-evolutionary fashion.1. Introduction
Ruth Millikan’s aptly titled 1984 book Language, Thought, and Other
Biological Categories inaugurated a strong naturalistic programme in the
philosophy of mind and language that has become known as “tele-
osemantics” or “biosemantics”. Its mission is to explain how linguistic
and cognitive forms acquire and carry their meanings by recourse to a
natural history of functions as selected-for effects of language- and
thought-producing mechanisms. Biosemantics explicitly relies on the
Darwinian concept of natural selection of variant hereditary traits, which
is extended by analogy to phenomena that are not strictly biological, such
as reproducible linguistic and cultural forms. There is no systematic
attempt in biosemantics to investigate whether and how these analogues
of natural selection might interact with the Darwinian evolution of
cognitive traits. Developing a conceptual grasp of such interactions might
strengthen biosemantic theory and help to solve some of its problems.
The aim of this essay is to explicate various interpretations of these in-
teractions, and to critically explore their bearing on biosemantics. So the
meta-question behind this inquiry is:22 August 2021;
evier Ltd. This is an open access aQ1 To what extent is the analogy between naturally selected traits
and intentionally designed forms supported by real relations be-
tween these domains?
If biosemantics is indeed a naturalistic programme that at least in part
seeks to answer philosophical questions by recourse to scientific concepts
and theories, its biological categories will be anchored in biological
theory in some way and to some degree. In that case, the domain of the
real relations in Q1 is not supposed to be empty. Under this premiss, I will
argue that the domain of possible real relations can be meaningfully
explored by contrasting adaptationist with pluralist readings of the
evolutionary concept of adaptation – a concept that is only marginally
considered in the biosemantic literature.
Of the interpretations that emerge, two will be particularly relevant:
First, on a linear model that takes its cues from the evolution of co-
operation and joint intentionality, linguistic forms and their functions
are grounded in the adaptive requirements of information exchange and
environment-bound co-ordination tasks. Second, on a mutualistic model
that takes its cues from mimesis and symbolism in the evolution ofrticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
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proper functions and analogue conditions of heredity, variation and se-
lection. Its functions are coupled with human cognitive traits but do not
per se subserve human adaptive requirements in the biological sense. In
this essay, I will sketch a path towards an evolutionary pluralist version
of biosemantics that will align with theories of cognition as being envi-
ronmentally “scaffolded”. Language and other cultural forms are partly
independent structures that acquire proper functions of their own while
being integrated with organism-based cognitive traits in co-evolutionary
fashion. The key advantage of this image over the linear model is that it
might better explain the emergence and use of complex, abstract and
fictional types of reference.
I will first briefly describe the core tenets of Millikan’s theory of
proper functions and its methodological commitments (Section 2). I will
then outline and discuss the concept of adaptation in contemporary
evolutionary theory, contrasting the claims of the adaptationist pro-
gramme with the main lines of evolutionary pluralist argument (Section
3). The resulting interpretations of the relations between evolutionary
processes and their analogues and their bearing on biosemantic theory
will be the respective topics of Sections 4 and 5.
2. Proper functions, biology and analogy
The key biological category in biosemantics is natural selection.
Natural selection and analogously characterised processes in culture and
learning are mobilised to account for the selected-for or “proper func-
tions” of animal and human abilities of representing world affairs, but
also for the capacity of language to do so. The following considerations
will focus on this basic idea, and they will mostly follow Millikan’s
original expression of this idea. However, I will also refer to the main
alternative versions of biosemantics developed by Fred Dretske, Karen
Neander, David Papineau and Peter Godfrey-Smith.
Before outlining the core tenets of Millikan’s original version of
biosemantics, two observations on methodology are in place: First, her
reference to “biological categories” has been expressly metaphorical in
intent from the start (Millikan, 2017, p. 5). Her claim is neither that
theoretical concepts from biology can be transferred to the domain of
language and thought in literal and wholesale fashion, nor are these
concept transfers expected to add to the body of biological theory.
Instead, a partial and qualified analogy is introduced in order to identify
a set of properties that biological, mental, linguistic and cultural phe-
nomena all have in common. Second, and by implication, Millikan’s
metaphorical use of biological categories is systematic in the way that
Mary Hesse (1966) and Max Black (1962) outlined in their accounts of
the role of metaphor and analogy in science. Theoretical concepts are
transferred from an established domain of science to a less explored
“target” domain in order to develop explanations and theories for the
latter. In the present case, Darwinian evolution is the source and lan-
guage and thought are the target domain.
According to Darwin’s original definition (1859), natural selection is
the differential reproduction of variant forms of hereditary traits within a
population over a number of generations, on the grounds of how the
effects of those variant traits respond to conditions in the population’s
environment. If the principle of natural selection has “analogues in
learning and cultural selection” (Millikan, 2017, p. 4), these will account
for the differential reproduction of variant reproducible features within a
population or, in Millikan’s (1984) terms, “reproductively established
family” of such features on the grounds of the effects that they produce
for members of that population in response to conditions in their envi-
ronment. The reference to “features” instead of “organisms” and “traits”
in my present reconstruction shall highlight the fact that the analogues of
natural selection do not necessarily operate on organic traits. Instead, the
biosemantic analogues of natural selection affect populations of repro-
ducible artefacts or forms of behaviour. Learning and cultural selection
will give rise to histories of reproduction and selection in their own right.
However, in specific cases and in specific ways, the mechanisms of299natural selection and its analogues might interlock, as will be outlined in
Section 4.
In committing her- or himself to an unitary mode of etiological
explanation across the board of admissible phenomena, the bio-
semanticist will recur to the contributions that the effects of the biolog-
ical traits or other reproducible features or “mechanisms” involved have
made to their reproduction within a population of – natural or artifactual
– bearers, as compared to the effects of variant forms of those mecha-
nisms in that population. By virtue of conferring a reproductive advan-
tage upon their bearers over the course of generations, the mechanisms
that produce those effects will acquire the “proper function” of producing
them (Millikan, 1984, p. 28 and Ch. 1–2 in general). Not just any
assortment of same-looking effects will be subsumable to the same
functional-historical account. They have to be results of the same history
of being reproduced in the sameway under the same type of conditions in
order to have the same proper function.
It is the direct proper function of a reproductively established mech-
anism to generate the kind of effects in question if these effects, qua
individually bearing certain relations to the environment, have in sum
conferred a reproductive advantage upon bearers relative to non-bearers
of that mechanism in a population. In turn, the individual effects have the
derived proper function of being adapted to some concrete world affair,
called “adaptor” (Millikan, 1984, pp. 40–41), if they have been produced
by some such mechanism that has been reproductively established
throughout a sequence of earlier generations for producing effects of the
same general type. Having been produced by such a mechanism is
necessary and sufficient for possessing the corresponding derived proper
function, whereas successfully performing that function in the individual
case is not. Conversely, the mechanisms in question possess their direct
proper functions because a sufficient number of them has successfully
produced the relevant effects with sufficient frequency over generations
of a population to incur a fitness value for their bearers.
Accordingly, proper functions in the first place pertain to the mech-
anisms or, in Millikan’s original wording, “devices” that produce the
relevant effects, and only in derived fashion to the individual in-
stantiations of these effects. “Mechanism” and “device” should here be
understood in the broadest sense, so as to include material patterns and
behavioural routines that produce some environment-directed effect in
frequent and regular fashion. This effect will have made a necessary
contribution to the reproduction of members of the type of mechanism in
question. It will therefore account for the establishment of a type of
mechanism in the first place. Typically, a mechanism’s contributions to
the conditions of its reproduction will be relevant on the level of a su-
perordinate system, such as an organism or a population, although this is
not required by definition. The functions of sub- and superordinate sys-
tems are often “nested” and dependent on each other, but might also
compete on various levels. However, in order to meet the adaptive re-
quirements of the members of a population of organisms, the proper
functions of various systems and sub-systems will have to be co-ordinated
to some degree.
Accordingly, the tokens produced by the mechanisms in question
have not been directly selected for their effects. It is the producing
mechanisms that are selected for by proxy of the effects of the individual
tokens that they and their ancestors produced in the past. To ignore this
proxy relation is a common and fateful misunderstanding of the central
claims of biosemantics. The misunderstanding is common, and perhaps
also intuitive, enough to be reproduced even by such accomplished
philosophers as Frank Jackson (2006), who assumes it to be a bio-
semantic claim to say: “x believes that P iff x is in a state that is selected
(in the evolutionary sense) to co-vary with P”. Instead, the claim should
read, to retain Jackson’s phrasing as far as possible: “x believes that P if
there are mechanisms within x that have been selected (in the evolu-
tionary sense) for producing tokens of P-type beliefs that reliably co-vary
with instantiations of P”. Note that there is no biconditional in the
rephrasing, as other things than the specific mechanisms indicated here
may cause items otherwise indistinguishable from P-belief tokens, and as
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if produced by the selected-for mechanisms, a P-belief token has the
derived proper function to thus co-vary with a concrete P-affair. The
mechanisms involved have to produce appropriate tokens with sufficient
frequency to ensure reproduction of those mechanisms and their bearers.
These tokens might even fail to perform their function quite often, as long
as a sufficient reproduction rate is ensured for the mechanisms and their
bearers.
Millikan’s favourite example of such mechanisms in animate nature
are bee dances: It is the direct proper function, in terms of having been
naturally selected for, of dance-producing and -perceiving mechanisms in
bees to guide worker bees to locations of nectar. In turn, it is the derived
proper function of any given individual bee dance to make a watching
bee fly towards the concrete location of nectar. These relations are best
expressed in terms of mathematical functions: transformations in the
location of nectar on different occasions are matched by transformations
in the direction, angle, and waggle frequency of the dance. A correct
mapping between dance patterns and locations of nectar is the “Normal
condition”, in Millikan’s terminology, for fulfilling the function of bee
dances to make bees procure nectar. This function may often fail to be
fulfilled, but it will have to be fulfilled frequently enough to ensure the
reproduction of bee-dance mechanisms in bee populations.
While being applicable to animal signalling and artefact functions
alike, the primary target of Millikan’s analysis are the proper functions of
human language and thought. They are addressed not primarily as
evolved, selected-for cognitive traits but in terms of their representa-
tional content. Representations work as “internal stand-ins exemplifying
structure-preserving mappings of affairs in the environment” (Millikan,
2017, p. 4). They do so because their producer and/or consumer mech-
anisms have been selected for enabling such relations.
On the “thought” side of the equation, cognitive traits have the proper
functions of either producing or using (or “consuming”) external be-
haviours or internal processes that stand in such rule-governed mapping
relations to certain types of world affairs. These mapping relations do not
have to bear a picture-like similarity relation to their object. Instead, they
are understood as point-to-point correspondences of the kind that is
found in mathematical functions. The mapping rules are determined in
accordance with what the consumer mechanisms involved require the
behaviour or process in question to stand for. Any concrete representa-
tional content depends on the “Normal” conditions of the fulfilment of
consumer functions, that is, the conditions under which the consumer
mechanism’s proper functions have been selected for with respect to a
given type of mapping relation. (The term “Normal” is capitalised by
Millikan to highlight its technical meaning in this context.) Human
cognitive accomplishments are special within this context, Millikan
maintains, primarily for the ability to use, and only secondarily for the
ability to produce, mappings that involve subject-predicate structures
and negation transformations. These are the necessary prerequisites for
articulating and using propositional content, making inferences and
performing acts of identification.
On the “language” side of the equation, language adds a particular
level of proper functions to the picture, inasmuch as it is not a mere
vehicle of content to be transmitted between speakers and hearers.
Instead, it is itself composed of reproducible items, namely lexical,
grammatical, and syntactic elements that form reproductively estab-
lished mechanisms with proper functions of their own. Their roles in
reference-making not only depend on co-operating producer and con-
sumer mechanisms in speakers and hearers but also on their own
reproduction in language use.
This twofold dependence gives rise to a more concrete research ques-
tion for our inquiry into the relation between the mechanisms involved:
Q2 What dependence relation exists between the naturally selected-
for proper functions of human cognitive traits and the proper
functions of language as a mechanism established by analogues of
natural selection?300On the one hand, the guidance of human activities through language-
use might be strongly mediated and indirect, but there is, Millikan (2006)
maintains, a bedrock of more immediate biological functions on which it
rests. On the other hand, the reproductively established mechanisms of
language may become coupled with human producer and consumer
mechanisms. These two kinds of mechanism may also compete and
mutually shape each other to some extent, as Millikan (2004, Ch. 2)
notes.
In what follows, I will demonstrate that the possible answers to the
previous question partly depend on the interpretation of the relationship
between adaptation, as the conceptual counterpart of natural selection,
and its analogues that goes into the biosemanticist’s argument. This
interpretation might be rather implicit, but has implications for the style
and direction of the biosemantic programme.
3. Adaptation, adaptationism, pluralism
In evolutionary terms, if an organic trait has acquired a function qua
having been selected for, it is an adaptive trait. The trait is an adaptation
to the conditions in the environment to which its effects have differen-
tially responded over a number of generations. Given that the proper
functions of language, artefacts and other cultural forms are understood
in analogy to the proper functions of hereditary organic traits, the
question arises whether and to what extent they can be characterised as
adaptations, too.
However, references to the notion of adaptation are conspicuously
rare in the biosemantic literature, despite the central conceptual role it
assigns to biological functions and natural selection. In Language,
Thought, and Other Biological Categories, one only finds a few uses of
“adapt” and “adapted”, which Millikan expressly distinguishes from
adaptation in a biological sense (1984, p. 40). She later published one
paper that contains an explicit defence of the notion of the human mind
as an evolutionary adaptation (Millikan, 1989a), and one chapter that
discusses the notion of adaptation and its critiques more broadly and
extensively (Millikan, 1993b). Other classic works in biosemantics vary
in their reference to adaptation:While the foundational text in etiological
functionalism (Wright, 1973) as well as David Papineau’s inquiries
(1984; 1987; 2001a; 2001b) that ran in parallel with Millikan’s do not
consider it either, and while even the biologically much more deeply
informed defence of “The Teleological Notion of ‘Function’” by Karen
Neander (1991a,b) omits it, too, a brief discussion of its relevance is
provided by Fred Dretske (1988, pp. 45–47). Peter Godfrey-Smith (1994)
explicitly employs the notion of adaptation when gauging the appro-
priate timescale for a history of functions. His work is an exception in the
field though, for not merely being biologically informed but profoundly
shaped by Richard Lewontin’s critical views of adaptationism (see p.1,
p.2 and p.4 below).
If one looks for reasons for the relative absence of the notion of
adaptation from biosemantics, there is a prima facie straightforward if
not obvious answer. It comes in two parts: First, biosemantics as a phil-
osophical approach to mind and language originated from and primarily
addressed problems within the tradition of disciplinary philosophy, so
one should not expect a wholesale and systematic commitment to bio-
logical concepts and theories from its classic works in particular. In fact,
while Dretske referred to pertinent biological literature already in 1988,
the other members of the founder generation started to do so only after
publishing their original theoretical statements (Millikan in 1989a;
1989b; 1991, to a fuller extent in 2004; Papineau in 2001a). Even the
limited evolutionary analogies and general naturalistic outlook of early
biosemantics were sufficient to solicit stiff resistance from more purely
minded philosophers. Second and in line with the programme’s original
intentions, any commitment to a biologically defined notion of adapta-
tion would conflict with the explicit biosemantic aim of attaining a level
of generality that encompasses analogues of selected-for functions
outside the domain of biological phenomena proper. Unlike for the much
broader concept of functions and its biological and non-biological uses,
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processes as adaptations would be a conceptual overreach in this respect,
and is rightfully avoided.
There is a complication though: To the extent that the biological
categories and the evolutionary naturalistic approach of biosemantics
substantially rely on biological theories and their explanations of the
origins and functions of human language and thought, and given that
adaptation is the conceptual counterpart to natural selection in
Darwinian evolutionary theory, acceptance by the biosemanticist of any
established definition of selected-for functions in the biological domain
will imply at least implicit acceptance of a corresponding notion of
adaptation, even if one carefully avoids applying the term “adaptation” to
analogues of naturally selected-for functions. Even if the evolutionary
concepts in biosemantics are merely intended to be informal analogies
that seek to abstract from the detailed and partly contested definitions
within biology, they will still be partial analogies of some specific among
the various conceptions of the pertinent phenomena. Otherwise, they
will risk ending up inconsistent or vacuous, inept of informing more than
a vaguely science-inspired philosophy.
Under an understanding of biosemantics as a genuinely naturalistic
project, acceptance of variant notions of natural selection-cum-adapta-
tion will give rise to variant pictures of the relations between biological
functions and their analogues, which I will discuss under points i.1
through i.4 in Section 4: Language, artefacts and other reproducible
cultural forms that are subject to selection might be explainable by
reference to a biological model of selection-for and adaptation but
otherwise remain independent phenomena, but they might also be un-
derstood either as biological adaptations in a direct sense or as subser-
vient to biological adaptations, or they might be found to be independent
but interact with biological adaptations.
In order to assess the scope and depth of the possible relations be-
tween natural selection, adaptation and their analogues, a basic under-
standing of adaptations in the biological sense will be required. Given
that the term has received numerous definitions in evolutionary theo-
rising over time that vary in reference to processes, properties of or-
ganisms and properties of traits – compare, for example, the classic works
of Wright (1931), Fisher (1930), and Williams (1966) respectively – a
first step will be to focus on adaptive traits as the pertinent meaning of
adaptations in the present context. The model for proper functions in
biosemantics are the selected-for effects of organic traits. Given that
adaptive traits, too, have been variously defined in the literature, I will
try to formulate a definition that is as basic, unequivocal and uncontro-
versial as possible in a contested field:
A. Adaptation: A trait T will be adaptive only if all of the following con-
ditions are fulfilled in the aetiology of T:
a.1 Fitness: T responds to a certain set of conditions C in a population P’s
shared environment E in such a way that its effects ϑ increase the
probability of reproduction of T-bearers relative to bearers of variant
traits T0 in P whose effects ϑ0 respond differently to the same C in E.
a.2 Heredity: T and T0 replicate through mechanisms whose degree of
fidelity is sufficient to ascertain that differential reproduction be-
tween T and T0 in P under C over a number of generations N depends
on variance in fitness.
a.3 Selection-for: Differential reproduction between T- and T0-bearers over
N can be directly attributed to the effects ϑ of T for T-bearers in P
under C, as compared with variant ϑ0 of T0 for T0-bearers in P under C.
The bottom line of A and any like-minded definition is that there will
be no adaptation without selection for the effects of heritable traits of a pop-
ulation of organisms in a given environment. Conversely, and when applied
to biological phenomena, this definition complements the definition of
proper functions in biosemantics: Whenever a trait has a proper function, it
is an adaptation to the conditions responsible for its selection. For example,301the haemoglobin present in most vertebrates’ blood has the selected-for
function of storing, transporting and releasing oxygen in the organism. It
is an adaptation to oxygen-supply requirements in aerobic organisms
whose metabolism requires more oxygen than can be dissolved in the
blood plasma. Temporary storage and transport of oxygen is the selected-
for function of its biochemical properties. Conversely, its spectral prop-
erties, which make it appear red when oxygenated, have not been
selected for but only selected, as they do not contribute to its relevant
biochemical properties. In many arthropods and molluscs, haemocyanin
has been selected for the same oxygen-supply task while appearing blue
under oxygenation. In evolutionary terms, haemoglobin and haemocya-
nin did not compete within the same populations but are hereditary traits
of differently constituted species that have been selected for the same
type of effect under the same type of conditions in different locales
(Burmester, 2001; van Holde et al., 2001).
Evolutionists’ disagreements on adaptation arise from variant in-
terpretations of the relevant terms in A: what overall status adaptations
have in an evolutionary framework, what the units and mechanisms of
heredity are, what the units and levels of selection are, and what the
presumed relations between trait, organism and environment are. There
is a wide spectrum of possible positions to be taken on each and all of
these interpretations, but evolutionists largely align into two distinct
camps, one “adaptationist” and one “pluralist”. Basically, where the ad-
aptationist will adhere to a restrictive interpretation of A while assigning
a central role to adaptation in evolution, the pluralist will allow for
various interpretations of adaptation under A while assigning it a more
circumscribed role in evolution.
To make this difference in approach clear, a first pertinent conceptual
distinction is that between natural selection of some trait and natural
selection for that trait, which is addressed in a.3. It has been introduced
by Elliott Sober (1984) and explored in its bearing on biosemantic ar-
guments by Goode and Griffiths (1995); Artiga (2011); Fulda (2015).
Selection-for always occurs with respect to certain effects of a trait,
whereas selection-of may include aspects of a trait that are independent
of adaptive requirements, or it may involve traits that free-ride on a
selected-for trait. In order to demonstrate that a trait has been selected
for, its particular contributions to the organism’s overall fitness will have
to be spelled out. Only selection for the effects of a trait under an array of
specific conditions will make it an adaptive trait. The point of dissent
between the adaptationist and the pluralist is the extent to which these
conditions can be identified for any specific trait, so that, in our above
example, haemoglobin and haemocyanin bear unequivocal fitness
values.
A second, related conceptual distinction relevant to the interpretation
of A has been highlighted by Elizabeth Lloyd (2017). Traits might either
be characterised as adaptive whenever hereditary variance, selection-for
and differential fitness obtain, or only if and when conditions a.1 and a.3
actually effect modifications of a trait that go beyond the boundaries of
ancestral variance in P, thereby affecting condition a.2. Only in the latter
case, accumulated selection processes can be held responsible for actu-
ally shaping or “engineering” a trait, such as the presence and function of
haemoglobin and haemocyanin in vertebrates and molluscs respectively.
On these grounds, the adaptationist argues that natural selection is the
main or exclusive creative factor and an “optimising agent” in evolution,
whereas the pluralist maintains that other factors are relevant, too.
The archetypical version of what would later be christened the “ad-
aptationist programme” by its critics was formulated in George C. Wil-
liams’ Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). His way of making
adaptation an expressly restrictive, “onerous concept” was, first, to
confine it to cases where selection-for actually furnishes evolutionary
design. Second, he tied adaptation to a narrow conception of genetic
inheritance, which in turn is defined in terms of natural selection: “a gene
could be defined as any hereditary information for which there is a
favorable or unfavorable selection bias equal to several or many times its
rate of endogenous change.” (Williams, 1966, p. 25) Genes are under-
stood here not as concrete material entities but as a “cybernetic
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1966, p. 33). This argument has been pushed further towards a much
more material, DNA-centric view of gene selection by Richard Dawkins
(1989), which then became the paradigm of the adaptationist pro-
gramme instead of Williams’ cybernetic view. Even if that programme is
not taken as far as postulating “selfish DNA” as the main driver of
evolutionary processes, it claims that neither phenotypical traits nor
groups or species are ultimately exposed to selection but genes as the
units of heredity. The selectively relevant environment of a gene are, first
and foremost, its alleles. Organism and environment are only considered
at a secondary level that is deemed reducible to processes at the genetic
level. The relationships between gene, organism and environment are
thereby subsumed under a unitary mechanistic, nomological explanation
– “the laws of physical science plus natural selection” (Williams, 1966,
pp. 6–7). Accordingly, only those traits will count as adaptive which are
genetically inherited within a population and shaped by selective pres-
sures from the environment.
The critical approach taken by the pluralist starts from the observa-
tion that, in order for this perspective to work, an organism’s traits have
to be viewed in isolation from each other and mapped onto a certain
genetic unit of heredity in order to find a specific adaptive effect for each
of them. In turn, a given set of environmental conditions is determined as
being mainly or exclusively in charge of shaping a set of adaptive re-
sponses through natural selection. The reductive, nomological approach
to explanation that manifests in the adaptationist view might be alto-
gether inadequate to the complexity of evolutionary phenomena, whose
nature cannot be inferred from simplified low-level phenomena that are
chosen for the sake of model tractability.
A set of interrelated positive pluralist arguments that are relevant to
the present argument can be described as follows:
p.1 Traits may become established without being selected for. Seemingly
adaptive, selected-for traits may be “spandrels” instead (Gould and
Lewontin, 1979). They might be by-products of adaptive traits that
have been selected for different effects, or they might have been
shaped by phyletic or developmental constraints, which are as such
beyond the regime of natural selection. Conversely, structures of
these kinds may be co-opted for some use on grounds other than
having been selected for. As “exaptations” (Gould and Vrba, 1982),
these co-opted structures do not serve a function and are not adaptive
unless they become subject to natural selection for their effects at
some later stage.
p.2 There are multiple, partly independent levels of selection. Natural
selection may affect genes as well as individuals, groups, species and
various other levels of biological organisation, where each of them
might be the lowest level that can be identified in terms of a given set
of fitness differences (Lewontin, 1970; Hull, 1980; Lloyd, 2017;
Okasha, 2006; Wade, 2016). Selection processes at the various levels
might either be hierarchically nested, or they might interact in
co-ordinated fashion, but they might also conflict with respect to the
effects that are being selected for. There is no necessarily given hi-
erarchy under which selection processes on these various levels
would serve a unitary set of adaptive purposes, as can be demon-
strated on the example of frequency-dependent selection (Jeler,
2017).
p.3 There are multiple, partly independent units and mechanisms of he-
redity. If one takes Williams’ original (1966) cybernetic definition of a
gene by its word, not only DNA but any entity that is replicable with a
degree of fidelity and with a reproductive rate that are jointly suffi-
cient for it to be subject to selection may count as a gene, including
cultural artefacts or Dawkinsian “memes” (Dawkins 1989; Wimsatt
1980; Hull 1982; for the relation between genes and selection, see
Wright 1980; Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Beurton et al., 2000; Grie-
semer 2000). Extending the critiques of a DNA-centric view, Devel-
opmental Systems Theory (Oyama, 2000; Oyama et al., 2001)
postulates the existence of systems that combine organismic and302environmental factors in an account of the transmission of phenotypic
traits, from differential expression of identical genotypes (Bateson,
2001; Gordon, 2001) to distinct developmental routes to a similar
phenotype (“phenocopying”, Goldschmidt, 1949). Either way, envi-
ronmental and other non-genetic factors are placed on equal
explanatory footing with genetic ones.
p.4 Organisms partly shape the ecologically and selectively relevant con-
ditions in their environments. Such shaping may occur coincidentally or
purposefully, but either way, organisms are not passively exposed to
selection (Lewontin, 1982, 2000). Purposeful shaping of the envi-
ronment may involve the creation of material structures and artefacts
or systematically seeking out favorable conditions (Godfrey-Smith,
1996). The adaptationist notion of pre-existing environmental con-
ditions as ecological niches into which organisms adapt will be
replaced by one of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al., 1996) or
environmental scaffolding (Sterelny, 2010; Caporael et al., 2014),
where conditions are modified not only for the attainment of proxi-
mate goals but ultimately also for further type A processes, broadly
conceived. Adaptation becomes a moving target once an organism’s
or population’s environment is acknowledged to be partly of their
own making.
If there are various mechanisms apart from natural selection by
which traits become fixed in a population (p.1), and if there are multiple
and partly independent levels of selection (p.2), and if ontogenetic
development is not sufficiently defined by genetic information (p.3),
and if organisms and populations themselves shape some of the selec-
tively relevant properties of their environments (p.4), these conditions
will individually suffice to make the case that there are key factors in
evolution that are not subsumable under an adaptationist explanation.
To the extent that these conditions are interrelated by association and
family resemblance rather than by necessity, they allow for gradations
and selective focus between them. However, to the extent that these
conditions coalesce into a unified programme, p.1 through p.4 will
jointly suffice to make the positive case that these factors permit
reproducible artificial structures with their own mechanisms of he-
redity whose effects may become subject to forms or analogues of
natural selection. This includes the possibility that structures and
functions established on the analogue level interact with conditions
relevant to natural selection.
4. Interpreting biological categories
The positions identified in previous discussion provide biosemantics
with a broad spectrum of possible interpretations of how its various
biological categories relate to each other and inform its programme:
i.1 There are analogies between naturally selected-for functions and
the domain of language and cultural forms, to the extent that similarly
structured processes can be detected in either domain, and be
described and at least partly explained in the same evolutionary
terms. However, forms of cultural evolution, along with their mech-
anisms of heredity, variance and selection and the resulting fitness
conditions remain largely independent from biological evolution.
This interpretation puts biosemantics in proximity to theories of
cultural evolution as an autonomous domain (Heyes, 2018; Mesoudi,
2011).
i.2 Language and cultural forms have naturally selected-for direct
proper functions on the level of the organic traits that realise them
and on the grounds of the genetic information that enables them,
whereas all their individual expressions have proper functions
derived from the operations of those hard-wired traits vis-a-vis con-
crete conditions in their users’ environments. This interpretation
views language and culture as direct expressions or as effects of the
expression of hereditary traits that are designed by natural selection.
This interpretation would put biosemantics in proximity to theories
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kow et al., 1992; Pinker and Bloom, 1990).
i.3 There is a relation between selected-for functions in the evolu-
tionary domain and the domain of language and cultural forms,
where this relation is linear and hierarchical. There are processes of
information transmission, variance and selection-for that occur
within the domain of language and cultural forms proper, but these
subserve and are dependent on naturally selected-for functions in the
evolutionary domain. Fitness values for linguistic and cultural forms
materialise in biological adaptations. This interpretation puts bio-
semantics in proximity to theories of the evolution of language and
culture that assign priority to biological adaptations (Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman 1981; Lumsden and Wilson 1981; Boyd and Richerson
1985; Durham 1991; for the key sources in the present context, see
below). An inverted version of this picture is provided by memetics,
according to which biological evolution partly subserves cultural se-
lection processes (Dawkins, 1989).
i.4 There is an interaction between selected-for functions in the
evolutionary domain and the domain of language and cultural forms,
where this interaction is mutual and non-hierarchical. The products
and effects of processes of information transmission, variance and
selection-for in the domain of language and cultural forms may
furnish some of the conditions relevant to informational, develop-
mental and selection processes in the evolutionary domain, broadly
conceived. Analogues of fitness values may pertain to language and
cultural artefacts themselves, where these may affect or be integrated
with fitness values of their users’ biological traits. This interpretation
puts biosemantics in proximity to genuinely co-evolutionary and
scaffolding theories of language and cognition (which I will more
closely consider below).
Of these interpretations, i.1 is the most modest and systematically least
forceful, whereas i.2 is strong but so reductionist that it carries little sys-
tematic force and ultimately contradicts the biosemanticist’s aims, while
i.3 appears as the prima facie most straightforward and i.4 as the system-
atically most far-reaching interpretation for the biosemantic programme.
In fact, i.1 is limited to proposing a modelling relation on the grounds of
partial analogies, in which some key characteristics of evolutionary pro-
cesses provide a template for the explanation of processes in learning and
culture. A modelling relation of this kind neither formally implies nor
informally involves any further claim concerning factual relationships
between the processes in either domain. To the extent that the purpose
here is to explore possible substantial relations between these domains, i.1
can be exempted from further consideration even though, taken by itself, it
is a tenable interpretation of the biosemantic project if conceived of as a
biologically inspired but not genuinely naturalistic endeavour. Conversely,
i.2 can be exempted from more detailed consideration for entirely
collapsing the domain of language and culture into the domain of bio-
logical adaptations. It leaves no space for an investigation of language and
culture in their own right. The justification for doing so is offered by a strict
and material reading of adaptationism, according to which everything that
could potentially be selected for when exposed to a certain set of condi-
tions in the environment can ultimately only be an expression of a certain
string of genetic information, and according to which everything that is an
adaptation has been designed by a process of natural selection for the ef-
fects of the traits thus expressed. Given these limitations of i.1 and i.2, the
following discussion will focus on the two remaining, more substantial
interpretations.
One will find support both for i.3 and for i.4 in the biosemantic
literature, but also for the systematically weaker assumption of plain
analogy (i.1), with gradations between them and without one interpre-
tation clearly prevailing over the others. In the case of Millikan’s writ-
ings, it is notable that she virtually never cites the classic sources of i.3 or
i.4, apart from Dawkins’ adaptationist-minded memetic take on a hier-
archical approach (1989), while explicitly, repeatedly and affirmatively
referencing Pinker’s outright reductionist i.2 view, which she never303systematically explores beyond endorsing the generic claim that lan-
guage must be a biological adaptation (Millikan, 1998, 2000, 2003).
Despite these apparent adaptationist commitments, there is some
ambiguous inclusion of spandrels and exaptations as possible sources of
proper functions in Millikan (1993b), contrary to the explicit reservations
against such a strategy in Gould and Lewontin (1979) and Gould and
Vrba (1982). Moreover, Millikan in several places endorses the view that
the primary role of natural selection is that of a control function that
stabilises existing traits (Millikan 1989a, 1993b; 2004, p. 8–9 n2; 2017,
p. 16, 84 n1). This contrasts with the general biosemantic commitment to
a definition of proper functions in terms of selected-for effects as a source
of design, as exemplified in Millikan’s reference to “the engineering [of
representations] having been owed to a process of selection on some level
or levels” (2017, p. 4). Here, selection is supposed to do at least some of
the engineering. If both claims are to be true, natural selection, and
arguably its analogues, too, will have to serve both stabilising and design
functions – giving the biosemanticist the task of telling apart their
respective contributions. This is a task that Godfrey-Smith 1994 contends
with in his “modern history” account of proper functions, according to
which the causes of the recent maintenance of a trait or other feature in a
population takes precedence over teleological and design considerations
that address temporally more remote conditions. The design of a trait
might partly owe to conditions other than having been selected for (cf.
p.1).
Not as obviously tied to immediately biological questions, Millikan in
some places critically appreciates memetic arguments and analyses how
the putative aims of memes as a “second replicator” may either com-
plement or lie at cross purposes with the biological functions of human
cognitive traits. She suggests that the former, while being subject to their
own regime of heredity, variation and selection, may become adopted for
coordinative functions among members of human populations (Millikan,
2004, Ch. 2). The space of possible relations between various evolving
systems of either kind raises the question of how their proper functions
are in fact integrated with each other. Millikan refers to such integration
in terms of “serial” (1984, p. 35) or “nested” proper functions (2017, p.
160) but appears to point towards two distinct shapes that such inte-
gration may assume.
Under the presumption of a type i.3 hierarchical model, the functions
of one system or subsystem subserve the functions of another, superor-
dinate one. It may be maintained, for example, that a visual system’s
structured output feeds into a detection system, which in turn is used to
produce behaviours towards what is detected. All co-ordination between
the participating systems will be geared towards the superordinate sys-
tem’s functions, hence towards its adaptive requirements, which pre-
supposes, first, that the superordinate system is in fact the relevant
reproducing unit that dictates a hierarchy of subordinate functions, and,
second, that the individual unit’s adaptive needs are in line with the
overall adaptive needs of its population. These assumptions in turn pre-
suppose uniformity of, or coordination between, selectively relevant
conditions and adaptive needs on all levels, from organic traits and
reproducible artifactual forms to whole populations. As the memetic
approach to language and culture expressly does not meet this condition,
its inclusion in a natural-historical account of the proper functions of
these forms would require specific explanations of how it may be sub-
sumed under a hierarchical approach.
In other places, however, traits are characterised as being co-ordinated
across various levels of organisation in more mutualistic and less hierar-
chical type i.4 fashion. Various systems and sub-systemsmight have proper
functions that are reproductively established each in their own right and
adapted to conditions in their shared environments. In that process, those
systems or sub-systems may become part of the selectively relevant con-
ditions of each other. They may share the same ecological environment, in
terms of relevant ambient conditions in a particular locale, while forming
part of the specific selective environments for each other, in terms of the
conditions for each other’s reproduction (for this distinction, see Brandon
1995). The relevant phenomenon is called “co-adaptation”. It may affect
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traits (as in Darwin’s original 1859 coinage of the term) as well as the joint
selection of genes at different loci (Dobzhansky, 1950) and ecological in-
teractions between species that co-evolve either to mutual symbiotic
benefit or into stable predator-prey relationships (Thompson, 1994, 2005).
However, co-adaptationmay also concernmulti-species systems that might
themselves become units of natural selection as “holobionts” (Gilbert and
Tauber, 2016; Lloyd and Wade, 2019; Roughgarden et al., 2018). The
paradigm holobionts are multicellular host organisms and their micro-
biota, which may become interactors in selection processes, provided that
their interactions remain in proper balance. In all of the previous cases,
there is selection for a set of effects jointly produced by otherwise distinct
systems or sub-systems, with or without co-operative purposes being
involved. If this latter, more pluralistic approach to the integration of
functions is maintained, the proper functions of various traits or structures
on various levels of organisation will interact in open-ended fashion rather
than being reducible to one unit or level of selection and a corresponding
unitary set of proper functions.
The latter, type i.4 interpretation in particular allows for the inclusion
of inter-organismic relations and environmental structures into an image
of co-evolutionary relations in which “The organismic process has no
skin” (Millikan, 1993a, p. 179). Artefacts or other reproducible structures
that affect the environment of their creators and users might be
co-ordinated with organic traits in such a way that the performance or
the establishment of the proper functions of either relies on the estab-
lishment and performance of the proper functions of the other, hence on
simultaneous selection for their respective effects. In the human case in
particular, the reproducible non-organic structure that appears to be
closely intertwined with the evolution of cognition is language, without
which the human mind could not perform, and possibly would not even
possess, some of its core functions.
5. Varieties of Co-adaptation
In view of developing a more detailed understanding of the hierar-
chical type i.3 and the mutualist type i.4 interpretation of the co-
evolution between biological traits and cultural forms, and on the
grounds of the preceding discussion of the role that the concept of
adaptation might play for biosemantics, the following set of definitions
can be introduced:
C. Co-adaptation: Cognitive traits T on the organic level and reproducible
cultural and linguistic forms L are co-adapted if and when all of the
following conditions are met:
c.1Adaptation: In accordance with a broad interpretation ofA, T and L (ad
a.2) reproduce on the basis of mechanisms of genetic or non-genetic
heredity respectively, (ad a.1) produce differential effects ϑt and ϑl
with respect to a set of conditions Ct and Cl in their shared environ-
ment E, and (ad a.3) are selected for these effects.
c.2 Proper function: T and L each have acquired direct proper functions of
their own, by virtue of their effects ϑt and ϑl having made a necessary
contribution either to their original establishment or to their
continued reproduction within a population P, or to both.
The previous hierarchical i.3 and mutualistic i.4 interpretations can
be accommodated by providing alternate versions of the last condition in
the C set:
c.3a Hierarchy: Effects ϑl of L belong to the selectively relevant conditions
Ct for the establishment or maintenance of T in such a way that the
performance of the proper functions of L is a necessary condition for T
to be adaptive for a population P of T-bearers and L-users. The
converse might hold for ϑt of T for L.304c.3b Mutualism: Effects ϑl of L belong to the selectively relevant conditions
Ct for the establishment or maintenance of T, and vice versa for ϑt of T
to Cl for L, in such a way that T and L are individually adaptive to Cl
and Ct conditions respectively and jointly adaptive for a population P
of T-bearers and L-users.
Despite outlining markedly distinct states of affairs, and despite their
apparent alignment with distinct views of the evolution of cognition, c.3a
and c.3b need not be altogether mutually exclusive. Instead, they might
be complementary and can be used to describe different types, levels or
temporal stages of system organisation that may be coupled with each
other, where mutualistic lower-level T/L couplings support higher-level
cognitive traits, or where lower-level hierarchical structures underlie a
more mutualistic co-evolution of organic traits and cultural forms.
If this analysis is to the point, c.3a and c.3b might help to explicate the
programmatic difference between Dretske’s and Neander’s causal-
informational and Millikan’s and Papineau’s “consumer” varieties of
biosemantics (see Dretske 1988, 2001; Neander 2012; Millikan 2001,
2004; Papineau 1984 respectively; see also; Godfrey-Smith 2020). By the
same token, c.3a and c.3b might jointly help to resolve the apparent
ambiguity between the hierarchical (i.3) and mutualist (i.4) in-
terpretations of the biological categories that I diagnosed in Millikan’s
writings in particular.
According to the causal-informational approach, the content of a
representation is the world affair that it has the function to provide in-
formation about. The function of a representation is determined by that
bundle of properties of an object, process or situation which to detect or
communicate is relevant to a concrete organism or to the members of a
specific population, as determined by their specific adaptive needs. The
informational approach thereby adopts an environment-to-organism
perspective: representations are produced in response to the conditions
in the organism’s environment, and they are shaped by the organism’s
needs with respect to these conditions. These conditions might include
the exchange of information between members of a population, but the
paradigmatic unit of analysis are an organism’s elementary perceptual
detection mechanisms. Higher-order human cognitive abilities and lan-
guage are analysed from the same perspective of informational re-
quirements as these more basic mechanisms.
According to the consumer approach, the content of a representation
is the mapping between the representation and a world affair that is used
by a system in such a way as to perform its proper functions under Mil-
likan-“Normal” conditions (see p. 4 above) – those conditions which
account for the proliferation andmaintenance of the consumer systems in
a population. The function of a representation is determined by the
conditions for the fulfilment of the proper functions of its user. In a
relevant subset of cases, the presence and proper functioning of co-
operating representation-producing systems are part of these condi-
tions. The consumer approach adopts an organism-to-environment
perspective: representations are used, and partly produced, in accor-
dance with the conditions in the organism or population that make them
Normally respond to conditions in their environment. This perspective
might include internal representations, but forms of communication
between members of a population are its natural paradigm.
Whereas adaptive needs with respect to the environment, and
therefore the conditions at the information source, appear paramount to
the informational approach, dynamic and more mutualistic processes of
co-adaptation between consumer and producer mechanisms that might
become partly detached from adaptively relevant conditions in the
environment form a key part of the consumer approach to biosemantics.
However, despite their explicit commitments to each one side of this
simplified image, biosemantic theories sometimes are moremulti-faceted
or even ambiguous about the relevant conditions on either side. Both the
notion of tracking conditions in the environment in perception and
communication and the idea of representing absent, distant, possible or
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sive in Millikan’s work but often run in parallel. An explicit connection
between them is formulated in her recent comparative discussion of
“infosigns” and “intentional signs” (Millikan, 2017) that is designed to
capture some arguments from informational biosemantics. In an attempt
to reconcile informational and consumer approaches, Nicholas Shea
(2007) suggests that basic forms of representation, whose success is
directly cashed out in terms of survival and reproduction, are anchored in
environmental information as an “input condition” while that condition
might be relaxed for higher-order forms of representation.
In order to anchor the distinction between the informational and the
consumer approaches to biosemantics in more systematic evolutionary
theorising, so as to better support them and relate them to each other, I
will turn to partly matching empirical modelling approaches to the co-
evolution of language and cognition. With some risk of over-
simplification and dichotomising admitted, there are, on the one hand,
hierarchical approaches to the co-evolution of language and cognition
that parallel c.3a above. Broadly subsumable under this set are studies on
the co-evolution of language and cognition through co-operation and
joint intentionality by Michael Tomasello (2008, 2014) and Morten
Christiansen, Kenny Smith and Simon Kirby (Christiansen and Kirby
2003; Christiansen and Chater 2008; Smith and Kirby 2008; but see also
Boyd and Richerson 2009; Bowles and Gintis 2011 on the evolution of
social cooperation more generally and Skyrms (2003); Godfrey-Smith
(2020) on the evolution of signalling games in that context). On the other
hand, there are more mutualistic coevolutionary approaches that parallel
c.3b. These are exemplified by the works of Merlin Donald (1991) on
mimesis and exograms and Terrence Deacon (1997) on language-brain
co-evolution. This is also the domain of theories of “cognitive niche
construction”, according to which cognition is closely intertwined with a
number of other abilities that manifest themselves beyond somatic
boundaries (Sterelny, 2007, 2012; Clark, 2006; Laland, 2017), and
related theories of environmental scaffolding (Caporael et al., 2014;
Clark, 1997; Sterelny, 2010) that highlight the role of material or idea-
tional structures in the development of organisms and their traits, abili-
ties and social organisation (see also Gibson and Ingold 1993; G€ardenfors
and Lombard 2020; Malafouris and Renfrew 2010; Renfrew 2012; Killin
2017; Greif, 2017).
All of these accounts equally support the claim in C that T and L are
co-adapted to the extent that the performance of the proper functions of
language depends on the coordination between biologically evolved
cognitive traits and culturally evolved artifactual and linguistic struc-
tures. They are also likely to agree, against the assumption of an innate,
domain-specific “language faculty” in Pinker and Bloom (1990) and
Chomsky (2006), that the biologically evolved cognitive traits involved
in language use are significantly more domain-general and that key
structuring features of human language pertain to reproducible linguistic
forms themselves. Likewise, they will agree in their scepticism towards a
presumed superiority of memetic cultural replicators.
However, hierarchical and mutualistic views are likely to diverge in
several other respects. Most obviously, they will disagree on whether
biological or cultural factors take the respective lead, or whether these
factors interact in mutual shaping processes that ultimately undermine
the very distinction between them. Methodologically, hierarchical and
mutualistic views will have to decide whether or not they seek to infer a
mechanisms’s original conditions of selection from the conditions of its
current proper functioning, and what role natural selection plays in
explaining the proper functions of language. On this background, the
respective approaches can be outlined as follows:
Ha The hierarchical model: The key factor in the evolution of language
lies in practical coordination with respect to some world affair be-
tween members of a group, facilitating the human-specific abilities of
imitation learning and joint intentionality that are required for the
relevant tasks. The proper function of language use will be primarily
and directly biological, with natural selection providing the core of305the explanation of its design. Language will be an adaptation to the
conditions in the environment of a specific population of organisms
that relies on complex collaborative activities of resource procure-
ment and protection. Cultural and linguistic forms make a key
contribution to these adaptive functions but will overall remain
subservient to them. They primarily provide the means of exchanging
complex information required for the collaborative activities in
question. The evolution of language is thereby explained in light of
the proper functions of language as they are discernible from a
contemporary perspective.
Hb The mutualistic model: The key factor in the evolution of language
lies in the development of complex social behaviours amongmembers
of a group, which is facilitated by embodied “mimetic” skills that also
form the basis of ritual, art, dance and music. The proper function of
language use primarily lies in forms of communicative expression
between group members that are neither per se nor ab initio referen-
tial. In part, these forms are subsequently exapted (see p.1 above) for
reference-making. Other factors besides natural selection will have to
be included in the explanation of this process. To the extent that
language is a biological adaptation, it will be an adaptation to the
emerging requirements of symbolic communication between mem-
bers of a population. Cultural and linguistic forms become part of the
conditions of the selection of the biological traits that enable these
practices. The evolution of language can therefore only be explained
in light of the specific situation of early homo populations, which
might have been different from contemporary conditions of language
use.
Keeping in mind that the approaches subsumed under these two
general models were largely formulated independent from and later than
the original statements of the biosemantic programme, one will still
recognise their respective parallelism to the biosemantic leitmotifs of
activity-oriented co-ordination and of representing absent, distant,
possible or fictional world affairs. The main disagreement between the
two models concerns the route between elementary forms of represen-
tation in perception and action and higher-order forms of representation
in thought and language.
Remarkably, many examples mobilised by Millikan and other bio-
semanticists in support of their arguments are borrowed from the domain
of animal signalling. Bee dances, mating displays and warning calls are
typically tied to immediate practical requirements and display a com-
bined descriptive and directive “pushmi-pullyu” character (Millikan,
1995). These examples and their discussion tend to leave an explanatory
gap with respect to how and why, in terms of natural history, the dif-
ferences between the abilities and kinds of reference-making involved in
animal signalling and human language first came to pass. After all, it is
not a given that their origins and purposes are of the same kind.
Co-operation and practical co-ordination might not even be the norm in
animal signalling, given that animal signals often serve deception
instead, and hence are more ambivalent in function than an animal
signalling-based model of the origins of language suggests (Sterelny,
2003, 2006; Birch, 2019; Martínez, 2019; Skyrms and Barrett, 2019).
Even if animal signals provide the model, truthful or pragmatically
adequate representation of world affairs might be just one among a va-
riety of functions of linguistic forms, as Millikan highlights in (2018), and
hence provides only one among a variety of explanations for their
reproduction in populations of language-users. It might not be their
primary proper function, and it might not have been the first.
Hence, the main point of contention between Ha and Hb is whether
one shall assimilate the functions of language to functions of information
exchange and co-operation between individuals that is modelled on
certain, information- and co-operation-oriented forms of animal signal-
ling, or whether one will do better assimilating them to ritual and sym-
bolism, whose functions are more self-contained, being geared towards
forms and modes of interaction within a group. Only in the former case,
the representational content of utterances and their frequency of being
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explanation of the selection of their producer and consumer mechanisms.
In the latter case, in contrast, the primary selected-for function of lin-
guistic utterances appears to lie not in what is communicated but in the
fact that something is communicated and how it is communicated.
Moreover, the possibility should be considered that the explanation of
the origins of the respective biological traits and linguistic forms is not
identical with an explanation of their more recent maintenance in human
populations. These explanations might undergo transformations in either
direction, from information and practical co-ordination to symbolism
and ritual and vice versa.
The relative advantage of Hb over Ha lies in the greater autonomy
from the model of animal signalling that it grants to forms human lan-
guage, and in its promise of overcoming if not closing the explanatory
gap between them that has been identified as one of the major problems
for biosemantics (see, for example Neander and Schulte, 2021). Where a
signalling-based approach faces the difficulty of explaining just how and
why higher-order, abstract forms of representation emerged from
perceptual detection and animal signals, and where its candidate expla-
nations will be quite directly measured with the yardstick of the potential
adaptive value of those higher-order forms, the mutualist model takes
higher-order forms of representation as phenomena in their own right,
with conditions of selection of their own. Their interplay with the se-
lection for corresponding organic traits will form the mutualist model’s
domain of the explanandum, for which it has a more diversified,
pluralistic repository of explanantia. The mutualist model also leaves
more room for the philosopher’s intuition that there is something specific
if not special about human thought and language that cannot be easily
cast in the form of adaptive values. The more detached the properties of
language become from direct adaptive needs, the more free they are to
become exapted for such uses in more sophisticated ways than offered by
signalling-based accounts. Still, this interpretation of the biosemantic
project will not only retain but possibly also strengthen its commitment
to evolutionary naturalism.
6. Conclusion
If the previous analysis is to the point, the answer to the general
question of this inquiry (Q1) is this: The proper functions of linguistic
forms are, on the one hand, rooted in the realm of developmental
structures whose operations and functions are partly independent of
biological adaptation sensu strictu, but bear tenable partial analogies to
the latter, in being subject to forms of heredity, variation and selection-
for. On the other hand, they interact with the evolution and maintenance
of cognitive traits in human populations. Only in conjunction will the
histories of linguistic forms and organic traits provide the full picture of
the foundations of human language and thought.
With respect to answering the more specific question of this inquiry
(Q2), the proper functions of language as a reproductively established
mechanism are neither ex hypothesi necessarily nor de facto exclusively
based on signal-based reference to and co-ordination of practical affairs
that would subordinate them to human adaptive needs on the biological
level. If the mutualist Hb model is correct, forms of language might have
first been established and maintained for producing other effects that
have no direct biological fitness values attached to them but in more
indirect ways became a human-made part of the selectively relevant
conditions in the evolution of human cognition. Conversely, if the hier-
archical Ha model is correct, forms of language might have been exapted
from functions of immediate adaptive relevance for more abstractive,
symbolic communicative purposes. A comprehensive argument to justify
the choice between these positions is beyond the scope of this essay, but I
am hopeful to have begun to make the case, on the basis of pluralist
evolutionary arguments, that an alignment with a mutualist Hb model
would optimally adapt biosemantics to its original purpose of formu-
lating a strong, comprehensive and balanced naturalistic programme in
the philosophy of mind and language.306Acknowledgements
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